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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
WILLS- INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE OF AMENDABLE Nox-
TESTAMENTARY DOCUMENT UPHELD.-Petitioner sought a deter-
mination as to the validity of the incorporation of a trust agreement
in a will. The Court held that since the document was in existence
at the time the will was executed, clearly identified therein, and of
such a nature as to preclude the possibility of fraud, mistake or
chicanery, it was an effective part of the testament. Matter of Snyder,
125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
The common-law courts of England, as early as 1607, permitted
incorporation by reference of a non-testamentary document in a valid
will,' if the document referred to was in existence at the time of the
testamentary execution and was identified therein in such manner
as to prevent judicial error.2 The Wills Act of 1837,3 which was
passed to provide uniformity in the execution of wills,4 specifically
required the testator's signature and the attestation of the witnesses
to be placed at the physical end of the document.5 Nevertheless, a
non-testamentary document, though not executed in accordance with
this statute, might still be validly incorporated in a will. 6
Early New York courts,7 viewing the common-law rule of in-
corporation by reference as not inconsistent with statutory require-
ments,8 adopted the doctrine. Subsequently, the rule was restricted
in its application to limited circumstances 9 so as to prevent any pos-
sibility of mistake, fraud or chicanery.' 0 This application of the rule
permitted incorporation of non-testamentary documents solely for
1 See Molineux v. Molineux,. Cro. Jac. 144, 79 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1605);
Milford v. Smith, 1 Salk. 225, 91 Eng. Rep. 199 (K.B. 1693).2See Croker v. Marquis of Hertford, 4 Moo. P.C. 339, 365-367, 13 Eng.
Rep. 334, 343-344 (1844) ; Smart v. Prujean, 6 Ves. 560, 565, 31 Eng. Rep. 1195,
1198 (Ch. 1801); see 34 HAtsBuY's LAWS OF ENGLAND 167 (2d ed. 1940).
3 7 WiL. IV & 1 VicT., c. 26.
4See Brooke v. Kent, 3 Moo. P.C. 334, 345, 13 Eng. Rep. 136, 141 (1840).
5 Wills Act, 1837, 7 WILL. IV & 1 VicT., c. 26, § 9. Prior to the passing
of this statute, the Statute of Frauds, 1677, 23 CAP. II, c. 3, governed the
form for devising real property by requiring conveyances in a will to be in
writing, subscribed by the testator and attested to by witnesses. See 1 DAvms,
NEW YomK LAW OF WILLS § 273 (1923).6 See Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moo. P.C. 427, 454-455, 14 Eng. Rep. 757,
767 (1858); Croker v. Marquis of Hertford, supra note 2 at 366, 13 Eng-
Rep. at 344.
7See Brown v. Clark, 77 N.Y. 369, 377 (1879) ; Jackson ex dem. Herrick
v. Babcock, 12 Johns. 389, 394 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); see Tonnele v. Hall,
4 N.Y. 140 (1850) ; 1 PAGE, WILLS § 255 (3d ed. 1941) ; 1935 LEG. Doc. No.
60(G), REPoRT, N.Y. LAW REvisioN CommissioN 431 et seq. (1935).
8 N.Y. REv. STAT. 1830, c. 6, tit. 1, § 40, Tonnele v. Hall, supra note 7;
see 1 PAGE, WILLs § 255 (3d ed. 1941). The statutory provisions are presently
embodied in N.Y. DEc. EST. LAW § 21.
9 See Cook v. White, 43 App. Div. 388, 393, 60 N.Y. Supp. 153, 157 (2d
.Dep't 1899), aff'd mem., 167 N.Y. 588, 60 N.E. 1109 (1901).10See Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 232, 118 N.E. 611, 613 (1918). It
should be noted that Judge Cardozo refers to the rule as the "rule against
incorporation." Id. at 233, 118 N.E. at 613 (emphasis added).
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purposes of identification," and of documents of a testamentary
nature.' 2 The incorporated testamentary document was required to
have been executed prior to the death of the testator so incorporating
it, and in accordance with the governing statute.13 Where another's
will is incorporated, it is operative, ".. . not as transferring the prop-
erty... [of the testator], but to define and make certain the persons to
whom and the proportions in which... [the property is to pass]." 14
Concededly, the primary concern of the court, in construing a
will, is to determine the intent of the testator.15 Thus, where the
testator incorporates another's will in his own by reference, he intends
that another, through that person's will, have the power of appoint-
ment over the testator's property.' 6 It is immaterial that the in-
corporated will is subsequently altered or amended,' 7 or even that it
is not in existence at the time of the incorporation.' 8 This is so, since
the testator's continuing intent is that the provisions of the other
person's will, whatever they might be, should control. The testator,
himself, cannot act in any way so as to change his expressed iimtent,
except by a codicil to, or revocation of, his own will.' 9 However,
where the document incorporated is of a non-testamentary character,
as was the inter vivos trust agreement in the present case, it must,
of necessity, be readily identifiable and in existence at the time of the
execution of the incorporating will.20 This is required because the
intention of the testator, as construed by the courts, is to incorporate
that document solely to identify the beneficiaries under his will, and
"2Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891) (where the
court refused to incorporate an unattested memorandum, listing securities and
to whom they were bequeathed as it was testamentary in nature and not merely
an instrument for identification purposes); see Matter of O'Neil, 91 N.Y.
516, 523 (1883) ; see Langdon v. Astor's Executors, 16 N.Y. 9 (1857) (where
entries in testator's account books were referred to for purposes of indicating
advancements made to beneficiaries under his will); Tonnele v. Hall, supra
note 7 (where a map of the real property devised was incorporated so as to
indicate the definite location of the property); 1 DAvms, NEW YORK LAW OF
W iLs §437 (1923).
12 Matter of Piffard, 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888) ; Matter of Fowles,
supra note 10.
1 See note 12 supra.
14 Matter of Piffard, supra note 12 at 415, 18 N.E. at 719, followed in Matter
of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 231, 118 N.E. 611, 612 (1918).
' 5 See Matter of Nelson, 268 N.Y. 255, 258, 197 N.E. 272, 273 (1935);
Matter of Neil, 238 N.Y. 138, 140, 144 N.E. 481 (1924); see 3 JESSUP-
REDFiaLD, SURROGATES LAW AND PRAcricE § 1828 (Rev. ed. 1949).
26 See Matter of Fowles, supra note 14; Matter of Piffard, supra note 12.
27 See Matter of Fowles, supra note 14 at 233, 118 N.E. at 613.
'sSee Matter of Piffard, 111 N.Y. 410, 414, 18 N.E. 718, 719 (1888);
President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 178,
21 N.Y.S.2d 232, 236 (2d Dep't 1940).
19N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 34.
20 See Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 332, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932).
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to determine the extent to which, and the manner in which, they will
take.21
In Matter of Rausch,22 the leading New York decision permit-
ting the incorporation of a non-testamentary document, the Court of
Appeals stated that "[h] ere the extrinsic fact [the incorporated, non-
testamentary document-an irrevocable trust agreement], identifying
and explaining the gift already made, is as impersonal and enduring
as the inscription on a monument." 23 This view expressly recognizes
the statutory mandate which requires the testator's intent to remain
immutable, unless altered or revoked by a testamentary act.24 Fol-
lowing the comment of the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division,
in President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowit, 25 refused to
recognize the incorporation of an amendable trust agreement, which
was amended subsequent to its incorporation in the will. In the
Janowitz case, the court distinguished the Rausch case in that the
document there was not subject to amendment or revocation.26 If
the court in the Janowitz decision had upheld the incorporation, the
testator's intent would have been, at least, partly modified or com-
pletely revoked by the subsequent amending of the non-testamentary
document. The instant case, in permitting the incorporation of the
readily identified and existing amendable trust agreement, there being
no amendment subsequent to the execution of the incorporating will,
appears to be an extension of the prevailing law in this jurisdiction.
The fact that the document in the Janouitz case was amended subse-
quent to incorporation, and not that it was merely amendable,
seemed to the Court, in the case under consideration, to have been
the controlling factor relied upon for that decision.27
To permit the incorporation of an amendable, non-testamentary
document must, of necessity, require the court to determine whether
or not the document was amended, and if found to have been so
amended, to deny the incorporation since it altered the testator's in-
tent by a non-testamentary act. The difficulty in conclusively deter-
mining whether or not the incorporated document was amended will
probably vary to the extent that the document was in the control of
the testator and thus susceptible to any subsequent changes by him.
Consequently, by extending the rule of incorporation by reference to
include amendable trust agreements, the Court, in the instant case,
21Id. at 331, 179 N.E. at 756; Matter of Andrus, 156 Misc. 268, 294, 281
N.Y. Supp. 831, 864 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; see 1 DAVIDS, NEw Yoax LAw OF WILLS§437 (1923).
22 See note 20 supra.
23 Id. at 332, 179 N.E. at 756.
24N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAw § 34; see Matter of Whitney, 153 N.Y. 259, 264,
47 N.E. 272, 273 (1897).25260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940).
2E6 Id. at 179, 21 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
27 See Matter of Snyder, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459, 463 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
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appears to have opened the door to chicanery and mistake beyond the
width originally intended by the Court of Appeals.
28
In this manner, the Court has augmented its already difficult
task of determining the testator's intent, not only by expanding the
area of assault upon a testator's expressed intent by a disappointed
devisee, legatee or distributee, but also by introducing the element of
uncertainty as to the future determination of the validity of an incor-
poration provision in a will. Rather than have this undesirable situ-
ation arise, the courts should require, as a condition precedent to a
valid incorporation, that such non-testamentary documents as trust
agreements be irrevocable in nature, as well as readily identified
therein and in existence at the time of the execution of the incor-
porating will.
28See Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 333, 179 N.E. 755, 757 (1932).
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